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2.1  Basic Features of the Australian System 
Australia  is currently  in the early stages of  introducing  a system of  self- 
provision for retirement through mandatory contributions to private superan- 
nuation funds. The system will take several decades to mature, but, when it 
does, it will substantially replace the government age pension, currently relied 
on by a large majority of  retirees. Since the government pension is unfunded,' 
the overall transition represents a move from a predominantly unfunded to a 
predominantly funded basis for retirement incomes over the next few decades. 
In making this transition, Australia is one of relatively few countries moving 
toward a funded scheme, and it is almost unique in adopting a system that is 
government mandated but privately operated. The purpose of this paper is to 
outline the basic features of the Australian system and its historical background 
and to give some analysis of its possible effect on saving and capital markets. 
The current policy has been put in place through a series of initiatives, to be 
elaborated on in section 2.2, that began in the mid-1980s. The various initia- 
tives did not follow a preannounced  plan but nonetheless have progressively 
established an overall timetable for phased increases in mandatory saving that 
now has bipartisan political support. The first main step was the introduction 
of a mandatory employer contribution  to approved superannuation  funds on 
behalf of each employee, set initially at 3 percent of salary. Subsequent policy 
decisions have provided for these to be increased to 9 percent of salary when 
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I. That is, it is noncontributory and funded from general revenue. 
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the timetable  is fully  implemented  in the  2002-3  financial year. Additional 
voluntary  contributions  are  also possible. Although  the  maximum  level  of 
compulsory contributions is thus scheduled to be reached in only a few years 
from now, it will be some decades before the system matures in the sense of 
yielding maximum retirement incomes. Because final benefits for each individ- 
ual will depend on the amount of savings they accumulate, the maximum level 
of  benefits  accruing from the compulsory  contributions  will  not be attained 
until retirement  of the first generation  with an entire working life under the 
new system. 
The superannuation funds that receive the compulsory contributions are, in 
contrast  those to  many countries, privately  run and managed. They are also 
typically defined-contribution plans. In introducing the new scheme, the gov- 
ernment has been able to take advantage of the existence of an already-large 
superannuation  sector,  which  handled  voluntary  savings  of  predominantly 
high-income  earners. This has meant that the compulsory  scheme has been 
able to make use of a well-developed financial infrastructure already in place. 
In effect, the government has decided to expand a savings vehicle in use by a 
minority  through  the  introduction  of  mandatory  contributions  for all  em- 
ployees. 
Traditionally, the main  source of  government provision  for retirement  in- 
come in Australia has been a flat-rate age pension, which provides a means- 
tested payment  generally indexed to 25 percent  of  average weekly earnings. 
This pension  has existed  for several decades and will remain  in place  as a 
safety net for those who do not accumulate sufficient private provision under 
the new system. The pension is funded from general government revenue and 
has never been contributory or related to an individual’s previous income. Al- 
though the pension is means tested and, in that sense, regarded as a safety net, 
it is currently the main source of income for more than 60 percent of retirees. 
To  provide  an international  context  for the Australian  system, figure  2.1 
gives a simple taxonomy of possible retirement schemes. 
Many industrial countries have opted for various forms of unfunded but con- 
tributory defined-benefit schemes. A common characteristic of  such schemes 
is that end benefits are related to an individual’s contributions record but that 
those benefits are not funded from contributions  in an actuarial  sense. This 
gives rise to a quasi-contractual set of unfunded liabilities of the social security 
system for future pensions. For countries with this type of system, an important 
consideration in any transition to a funded scheme concerns the treatment of 
these existing unfunded liabilities. 
In Australia, the transition envisaged is quite different since the existing gov- 
ernment pension is flat rate and noncontributory and does not involve unfunded 
liabilities in the same way as social security schemes in other countries.’ The 
2.  Governments do, however, have  considerable  unfunded  superannuation  liabilities to  their 
own employees. The total unfunded liability to employees of all levels of government in Australia 
is estimated to be around $100 billion, or around 20 percent of GDP. 65  Australia's Retirement Income System 
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Fig. 2.1  Taxonomy of retirement schemes 
transition  to a substantially reduced reliance on the government pension will 
occur as a gradual consequence of the accumulation of private savings as the 
new defined-contribution scheme matures. Application of the existing means 
test will eventually ensure reduced eligibility for the government pension, as 
privately provided retirement incomes are raised. 
The country that bears the closest similarity to the new Australian scheme 
would seem to be Chile, which also requires compulsory contributions to ap- 
proved private funds. However, in contrast to Australia, Chile had a preexisting 
contributory pension with associated unfunded liabilities and has therefore had 
significantly different transitional issues to deal with. Another important differ- 
ence has been that Chile allows individual choice of the fund, whereas in Aus- 
tralia the choice is typically made by employers or unions; however, this is to 
change as a result of recently announced measures to allow greater individual 
choice. 
2.2  Background and Objectives 
Australia first introduced an age pension in 1909. It was designed for pov- 
erty alleviation rather than as a comprehensive income support and was tightly 
means tested. Subsequently, however, the means tests were gradually relaxed, 
and the system took on more of the nature of a general entitlement. The take- 
up rate increased substantially, from around 30 percent when first introduced 
to a peak of around 85 percent in the mid- 1980s; this has since fallen slightly, 
partly  as a result of various  measures to tighten eligibility since that time.3 
Although the pension provides  a relatively  low level of income support, its 
value  is increased by  a variety  of health  and  public transport  subsidies for 
which pensioners are also eligible, and there is some scope to earn supplemen- 
tary private income. Also, in contrast to many countries, the large majority of 
elderly people own their own homes. The prominent role of the age pension 
across all but the highest income groups in the elderly population is illustrated 
by the summary of household characteristics presented in table 2.1. 
3.  For a discussion of this history, see Department of Social Security (1983) and Gruen (1985). 66  Malcolm Edey and John Simon 
Table 2.1  Households Where Head of Household Is over 65: Characteristics by 
Income Quintiles 
1  2  3  4  5  Total 
Average weekly household 
Proportion of income from 
Average number of 
Proportion of households 
incomes (S)  129.16  196.73  273.21  351.19  790.81  348.68 
government benefits (70)  106.40  84.60  84.90  66.50  22.30  54.40 
persons per household  1.11  I .08  1.83  1.89  2.32  I .65 
in group that own house 
outright (%)  71.00  67.30  80.00  79.70  87.70  77.10 
Source: Household Expenditure Survey, 1993-94,  Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
Voluntary superannuation has long been an important source of retirement 
income for a minority, mainly high-income earners and public-sector employ- 
ees. As is common in many countries, voluntary superannuation savings bene- 
fited from generous tax treatment. Employer contributions and earnings on ac- 
cumulated contributions were essentially tax free prior to  1983, subject only 
to a final tax on 5 percent of the accumulated lump sum at retirement. The tax 
benefit was particularly valuable for taxpayers on high marginal tax rates, but 
it was not necessarily attractive for low-income earners for whom a significant 
factor in savings decisions could be the potential effect on entitlement for the 
government pension. Tax  concessions  for superannuation  were  substantially 
curtailed in 1983 with the introduction of a 30 percent tax on lump sum bene- 
fits accrued after that date, and the system was further tightened by  changes 
made in 1988 and subsequent years, including the introduction of a tax on fund 
earnings.  Nonetheless,  the tax  treatment  of  superannuation  remains conces- 
sional in a number of ways that are discussed further below. 
The move to a system of compulsory superannuation had its origin in cen- 
tralized wage negotiations that took place in 1985 and 1986. The federal gov- 
ernment agreed to support a claim by the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
(ACTU) for a 3 percent employer-provided superannuation benefit to be incor- 
porated in employment awards in lieu of a general wage increase. This was 
endorsed by the Industrial Relations Commission in June 1986. The move was 
advocated as a means of making Superannuation more widely available, and it 
was also seen as furthering macroeconomic goals by promoting private saving. 
As a result of the decision, the 3 percent superannuation benefit was gradually 
incorporated in employment awards as they came up for renegotiation. These 
payments were directed either into existing funds or into union-created “indus- 
try” funds that in other respects were the same as those already in existence 
(i.e., managed by private funds management firms). 
In  199  I, the government announced a significant expansion of  compulsory 
superannuation, along with the introduction of a new compliance mechanism 67  Australia’s Retirement Income System 
Table 2.2  Superannuation Coverage 
Public Sector  Private Sector  All Employers 
% of 
%  Labor  % 
Covered  costs  Covered 
1985-86  32.3 
1986-87  63.4  31.8 
1987-88  68.0  34.1 
1988-89  90.4  40.7 
1989-90  91.7  56.9 
1990-9 I  93.9  6.0  67.5 
I99 1-92  94.6  6.4  70.7 
1993-94  97.0  6.9  89.4 
% of  % of 
Labor  %  Labor 
costs  Covered  costs 
3.3 
3.4  41.6 
3.5  44.0 
3.2  54.8 
3.8  66.9 
3.9  75.3  4.6 
4.2  77.6  4.9 
4.9  91.5  5.6 
Source; Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
known as the superannuation guarantee charge (SGC), which gave the system 
the basic shape it has today.4  The SGC legislation established a timetable for 
employer contributions to be increased to 9 percent in most cases by the 2000- 
2001 financial year, with tax penalties for nonc~mpliance.~  Further measures 
were announced in 1995 to encourage additional contributions of 3 percent by 
employees, to be supplemented by  a matching contribution from the federal 
government, thus bringing the total level of contributions eventually to 15 per- 
cent. (In the 1997 federal budget, this component of the scheme was replaced 
by a tax rebate on personal savings.) The move to a legislated system for em- 
ployer contributions was partly a response to problems of administrative com- 
plexity and slow compliance under the award-based system. Award superannu- 
ation did  not  cover some significant parts  of  the workforce  (e.g., the  self- 
employed and part-time workers) and was taking longer than anticipated to 
implement because of negotiation delays.6  As shown in table 2.2, superannua- 
tion coverage has widened substantially as a result of these measures. 
The broad parameters of the compulsory superannuation policy have biparti- 
san political support, with the newly elected government in  1996 having en- 
dorsed the overall targets set by the previous government, although not neces- 
sarily  the  implementation  method  for  employee  contributions.  The  new 
government announced further changes in the 1996-97  budget, including the 
introduction of  retirement  savings accounts and a number of  changes to the 
taxation of superannuation. 
4.  Full details are set out in “Superannuation Guarantee Levy” (Commonwealth Treasury 1991). 
5. Vesting and preservation requirements were also standardized. Benefits were now required 
to be fully vested in the employee immediately and to be preserved in a superannuation fund until 
at least age fifty-five. 
6.  Seventy-five percent of employees had superannuation coverage by  1991, five years after the 
initial decision by the Industrial Relations Commission. 68  Malcolm Edey and John Simon 
Introduction of the compulsory superannuation plan reflected a combination 
of  policy  concerns  broadly related  to the issue of  raising  aggregate  saving. 
Like a number of other industrial countries,  Australia has an aging population 
structure. However, the aged dependency ratio is still quite low and is not pro- 
jected to rise as steeply as elsewhere (table 2.3), so it is ironic that Australia 
has moved comparatively early to establish the basis for a funded scheme. The 
timing of the initial move to award-based superannuation was in a sense acci- 
dental, reflecting the intricacies of the wage-bargaining  process at the time. 
Nonetheless, the general policy thrust reflected underlying objectives of raising 
aggregate saving (an important macroeconomic objective in its own right) and 
of providing funded retirement incomes for the majority of employees. Once 
the principle of mandatory  contributions  was established, subsequent exten- 
sions to the scheme were aimed at increasing  those contributions  to a level 
high enough to ensure that these objectives could be adequately met. 
The objective of increasing national saving in Australia has been on the pol- 
icy agenda since at least the mid-l980s, when a chronically large current ac- 
count deficit became apparent. The deficit reached 6 percent of GDP at that 
time and has since continued to fluctuate mainly  in the 3-6  percent  range, 
regarded by the government and many other observers as uncomfortably high. 
It is also the case that Australia is a relatively low-saving country, at both na- 
tional and household levels, as discussed further in section 2.5. This combina- 
tion of facts created a powerful prima facie argument for policies to promote 
aggregate saving. One important dimension of the policy debate has related to 
the role of fiscal policy, where there has been considerable  emphasis on the 
need to improve cyclically adjusted budget balances. 
There is also widespread agreement in Australia on the desirability of pro- 
moting private saving. It is argued that households undersave for a variety of 
reasons, including an inherent tendency to discount the future too heavily and 
disincentives to private saving created by the government pension system. Re- 
garding the latter, it is argued that the system has created significant incentives 
Table 2.3  International Comparison of Aged Dependency Ratios 
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for low- and middle-income earners to qualify for the age pension by not sav- 
ing “too much.’”  The high take-up rate of government pensions, discussed ear- 
lier, is often cited as support of this view. Purely incentive-based approaches to 
promoting private saving, as existed under the pre- 1983 taxation arrangements, 
appeared to have little effect on saving by low- and middle-income earners. 
Given this background and the objective of  ensuring comprehensively  avail- 
able retirement support, the move to a compulsory saving system seems a logi- 
cal  outcome.  The existence  of  a  significant  private  superannuation  system 
when the policy was introduced and a desire to achieve maximum returns were 
probably both important factors in ensuring that a privately run system was the 
preferred option. 
2.3  Tax Treatment 
The tax rules for superannuation are extremely complex and can be outlined 
here only briefly. Important changes to the tax rules were made in 1983, 1988, 
1992, and 1996 that generally reduced the tax benefits to superannuation, al- 
though the treatment remained concessional. These changes and the current 
system are described in detail in the appendix. Changes were generally grand- 
fathered at each stage, with the result that retirees would receive benefits taxed 
under a variety of rules depending on when contributions were made. The fol- 
lowing description outlines basic features of the rules as they currently apply 
to new contributions. 
The system distinguishes between contributions by employees (which are 
still largely voluntary) and those made by employers.* 
Employee contributions are made from after-tax income. These contribu- 
tions, in nominal terms and excluding the earnings they generate, are effec- 
tively available to be returned to the contributor after retirement without being 
further taxed. Earnings, however, are taxed in the same way as earnings from 
employer contributions, as outlined below. 
Employer contributions and earnings on contributions from either source 
are taxed in the following way. Contributions are tax deductible to the employer 
but are subject to a  15 percent tax on entry to the fund. Following  changes 
announced in the  1996-97  budget, this tax rate rises to 30 percent for high- 
income earners (for details, see the appendix). Fund earnings are then subject 
to a  15 percent tax each year as they  ac~rue.~  The taxation  of  final benefits 
7.  For a review of these arguments, see Freebairn, Porter, and Walsh (1989), Edey and Britten- 
Jones (1990). Robinson (1992), Bateman and Piggott (1993), and FitzGerald (1996). 
8.  Special rules apply to the self-employed, effectively allowing them “employer” tax treatment 
on part of their contributions, which is more favorable than “employee” treatment. 
9. The actual tax paid is much less because funds are able to benefit from imputation credits 
for company tax  already paid on their dividend receipts. These credits can be applied against 
taxable income from other sources, substantially reducing the overall tax liability. 70  Malcolm Edey and John Simon 
financed by employer contributions and earnings depends on the form in which 
the benefits are taken. Annuities are subject to normal personal income tax as 
payments are made, less a 15 percent rebate, which is a form of compensation 
for the tax already paid on entry to the fund. Lump sum payouts are taxed at a 
standard rate of 15 percent (plus the Medicare levy) on amounts in excess of a 
tax-exempt minimum. The relative attractiveness of the two types of benefit 
will depend on a number of factors, including the size of the overall benefit 
and the retiree's income from other sources.") 
All the concessional treatment implicit in these arrangements  is subject to 
reasonable benefit limits (RBLs). These set the maximum amount of conces- 
sionally taxed  benefits  a person  may receive in  a lifetime,  and benefits  ex- 
ceeding those limits are subject to standard marginal tax rates. The limits are 
higher for benefits taken in the form of annuities than for lump sums, a mecha- 
nism for discouraging  the use of lump sum benefits. Changes introduced  in 
1992 substantially reduced the RBLs for high-income  earners by  expressing 
RBLs as flat rates rather than as multiples of income. 
In its broad structure, the tax system for superannuation can be described as 
embodying a hybrid between expenditure tax and income tax principles. " Un- 
der a pure expenditure tax treatment, saved income (Le., contributions and fund 
earnings) would be tax free, while postretirement expenditure (roughly equiva- 
lent to the annuity payment) would  be taxed at standard rates. The various 
concessional elements in the tax treatment outlined above go some way toward 
approximating such an outcome. For employer contributions, if we do the men- 
tal exercise of offsetting the contributions tax against the postretirement rebate, 
then contributions  would be viewed as tax free, with annuity benefits  taxed 
at  the  standard  marginal  rate.  Since fund earnings are only  lightly  taxed 
during the accumulation phase, the overall treatment of employer contributions 
could therefore be said to resemble that of an expenditure tax. Employee con- 
tributions are less favorably treated because they are made from after-tax in- 
come but  still give rise to taxable  earnings  during the  accumulation  period 
and in retirement. Again, however, the taxation of earnings on these savings is 
considerably lower than would be the case outside the superannuation system. 
The tax concessions for superannuation have a significant revenue cost, esti- 
mated in  1994-95  to be $7.3 billion, or around  1.6 percent of GDP. Most of 
this cost is accounted for, in roughly equal amounts, by  the concessional tax 
rates applying to employer contributions and to fund earnings. These estimates 
are calculated relative to a baseline under which superannuation is taxed in the 
same way as other financial saving, which in Australia is essentially an income 
taxation system. Some commentators, such as Bateman and Piggott (1997)  and 
FitzGerald (1996), argue that this is not the appropriate baseline and that the 
revenue costs are therefore overstated. 
10. For an analysis, see Atkinson, Creedy, and Knox (1995). 
I I.  A similar view is expressed by Covick and Lewis (1993). 71  Australia's Retirement Income System 
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Fig. 2.2  Assets of life offices and superannuation funds (% of GDP) 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics; Foster ( 1996). 
2.4  Role of Superannuation in the Financial Sector 
Assets of  superannuation  funds and life insurance  offices have fluctuated 
mainly in a range of around 20-25  percent of the Australian financial system 
in recent decades.'* They are currently around 26 percent, having risen strongly 
in recent years, and this share could be expected to increase further in future 
decades as compulsory contributions accumulate. The historical importance of 
these institutions reflected the significant use of superannuation as a voluntary 
savings vehicle, as has been discussed above, and was in part a result of their 
tax-favored  status. There are currently over 100,000 superannuation  funds in 
Australia, which range from the very large (the ten largest fund managers con- 
trol around 60 percent of the assets) to the so-called do-it-yourself (DIY) funds 
with only a few  member^.'^ 
Trends in the superannuation  sector's  overall size and its sources of funds 
are summarized in figures 2.2 and 2.3. Broadly, the historical growth of the 
superannuation sector can be divided into three phases. The first phase, which 
ended in the early 1970s, was one of  moderate and fairly steady growth. In the 
12. For statistical purposes, it is useful to treat life insurance and superannuation funds as a 
single aggregate because their activities are similar and much of the historical data do not distin- 
guish between the two. 
13. The situation is complicated by  the fact that the major fund-management groups can run 
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Fig. 2.3  Net contributions and growth in superannuation assets (% of GDP) 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
second phase, which covered most of the 197Os, superannuation assets shrank 
relative  to nominal GDP, largely  reflecting  poor earnings  performance  and 
high inflation. The third phase, from the early 1980s on, has been one of rapid 
expansion in which total assets more than doubled as a ratio to GDP, although 
this may have slowed down in the last few years. The data presented in figure 
2.3 divide the sources of superannuation asset growth between net new contri- 
butions  and  a residual  representing  earnings  on existing  assets  and  capital 
gains. Although net contributions have fluctuated significantly in some periods, 
it is apparent that most of the variation in overall growth performance can be 
attributed to variation in the earnings and capital gain component rather than 
in  contribution^.'^ The three growth phases outlined above correspond broadly 
to periods  of  moderate, negative,  and high real  rates  of  return  on financial 
assets, as summarized in table 2.4. 
On the basis of currently available data, aggregate net contributions to su- 
perannuation funds do not yet show the upward trend expected to result from 
the compulsory plan.15 A number of  possible reasons can be  given for this. 
First, there is likely to be a strong cyclic influence on net contributions. They 
14. Capital gains are likely, however, to be understated in the 1960s and 1970s, and overstated 
in the early 1980s, as a consequence of  the widespread use of historical cost valuations prior to 
the 1980s. 
15. These data should be interpreted cautiously, however, as they have in the past been subject 
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Table 2.4  Superannuation  Fund Earnings Rate 
Average  Inflation 
Earning Rate  Rate 
1960s  5.2  2.5 
1970s  6.8  9.8 
1980s  14.9  8.4 
Early 1990s  6.8  3.0 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
fell substantially in the recession of the early 1980s, when withdrawals related 
to early retirements were likely to have been particularly important. This may 
again  have  been  a  factor  in  the  early  1990s. In  addition,  many  voluntary 
schemes contain a tranche of employee-contributed funds that do not have to 
be preserved to retirement but can be withdrawn on leaving a job.16 There is 
also provision to allow early withdrawal of funds in cases of hardship. For all 
these reasons, recessions can be expected to result in significantly increased 
withdrawals  from superannuation funds as jobs are lost.  Second, many em- 
ployers were already satisfying, at least partly, the requirements of the compul- 
sory plan under preexisting voluntary  arrangements. This has allowed  some 
scope for absorption of the compulsory scheme into existing arrangements and 
has meant that the aggregate effect of  the new compulsory schedule has so 
far been relatively small; but it can be expected to increase as the mandatory 
contributions  rate  increases  significantly  above  levels  currently  prevailing. 
Third, an important factor in the second half of the 1980s was the phenomenon 
of overfunding of existing defined-benefit schemes. High rates of return meant 
that surpluses were accumulated in many of these schemes, enabling the em- 
ployers who sponsored them either to withdraw funds or to finance their super- 
annuation liabilities with reduced contributions. Finally, it is possible that in- 
creased  tax  rates  on  superannuation  savings  after  1983  have  discouraged 
voluntary contributions.17 
These factors provide a useful qualitative explanation for the behavior of 
aggregate contribution rates. However there is no direct way of measuring their 
quantitative effect and thus arriving at some measure of an “underlying” trend 
in contributions. This is an important issue for further investigation since, as 
discussed below in section 2.5, the capacity of the scheme to meet its objec- 
tives hinges critically on its compulsory nature and on the ability to discourage 
unintended leakages. 
One important dimension of  this  issue is the growth of “rollover” funds, 
16. Recent regulatory changes restrict this right of  withdrawal, subject to grandfathering of 
existing withdrawable amounts. 
17.  There is also a serious longer-term policy concern: the potential for funds to leak from the 
compulsory scheme owing to incentives favoring early retirement and the dissipation of accumu- 
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created in  1983 as a vehicle for deferring tax liabilities by  preserving  with- 
drawn benefits within the tax-favored system.IX  Funds withdrawn as a result of 
leaving a job can be deposited in a rollover fund (until required to be drawn 
on) and continue to be treated for tax purposes like other superannuation funds. 
They can also be moved from one such fund to another at the discretion of the 
member. Rollover funds are a relatively  small component of the superannua- 
tion system by assets (around 5 percent in  1995), but, because they are mobile 
at the member’s discretion, they are responsible  for a large part of the gross 
flows illustrated in figure 2.4. Part of the impetus for this increased turnover in 
the early  1990s probably came from increased redundancies  and early retire- 
ments. 
Assets of superannuation funds are invested across a wide spectrum of tradi- 
tional investments, with no important portfolio restrictions other than a limit of 
10 percent on the proportion of  funds that can be invested with the sponsoring 
employer. Investments in the broad categories of equities, bonds, and property 
are shown in figure 2.5. The predominant trends have been a substantial reduc- 
tion in the portfolio share of bonds and a rise in that of equities over the past 
three decades. Property  investments had also been on an upward trend over 
much of the period but fell sharply at the end of the  1980s and in the early 
1990s, largely reflecting valuation effects following the collapse of the prop- 
erty market. The long-term reduction in bond portfolios is likely to have been 
18.  Following rule changes in  1992, rollover-fund operations as described here can now be 
carried out within ordinary superannuation funds. 75  Australia’s Retirement Income System 
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Fig. 2.5  Superannuation funds asset allocation, proportion of asset types in 
super funds 
Sources: Australian Bureau of  Statistics; Foster ( 1996). 
a consequence  of removal  of  earlier portfolio  restrictions  setting minimum 
holdings of  government  bonds,19 along with  a trend decline in public-sector 
debt ratios that reduced the available supply. Holdings of foreign assets are not 
separately shown in the figure as consistent data are unavailable for much of 
the period. However, their portfolio share has grown rapidly  in  recent  years 
and is currently around 13 percent. A more detailed snapshot of the asset allo- 
cation at the end of  1995 is presented in table 2.5. 
The superannuation sector is projected to expand considerably in future de- 
cades as the compulsory increases in contributions take effect. One estimate 
suggests an approximate doubling of the sector in relation to GDP, from 40 to 
76 percent  of  GDP by  the  year  2020  (Knox  1995).*O This  policy-induced 
expansion raises a number of issues concerning the competitive position of 
superannuation  within  the  financial  system and the  size of  superannuation 
funds in the markets in which they operate. Some observers have argued that 
growth in the superannuation sector will in some degree occur at the expense 
of banks or will occur in a way  that increases competitive pressure on banks 
(see, e.g., Thom 1992).  Another issue is the possibility that the superannuation 
funds will “run out” of domestic assets to purchase as they expand or that their 
19. Until  1981, funds were required to hold at least 30 percent of  their assets as government 
20.  The estimates are for the superannuation sector excluding life-office business. 
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Table 2.5  Assets of Superannuation Funds (December 1995) 
$billion  % 








40.4  14.5 
20.7  7.4 
53.7  19.2 
99.2  35.6 
24.2  8.7 
37.2  13.3 
3.4  I .2 
279.0 
Source: Australian Bureau of  Statistics 
holdings of  such assets will grow to a point where they significantly change 
the characteristics of domestic asset markets. These issues are closely related 
to the question of how effective compulsory superannuation will be in generat- 
ing additional saving rather than displacing existing forms of saving. To the 
extent that new saving is generated, it could be expected to lead to a general 
expansion of the financial system and of the supply of domestic assets, along 
with an accumulation of foreign assets, rather than drawing funds from other 
domestic financial institutions. 
A good general case can be made that there has in the past been relatively 
little competitive overlap between  banks  and the  superannuation  sector, al- 
though  in  some respects  this  competitive  separation  seems  to be  breaking 
down, particularly on the liabilities side. On the asset side of these institutions’ 
balance  sheets, the  competitive  separation has been  strong. Superannuation 
funds invest primarily in securities, while the traditional core business of banks 
is in nonsecuritized lending.*’ Banks’ traditional lending activities now repre- 
sent a declining proportion of their balance sheets and profits, but this is part 
of a worldwide phenomenon related to improvements in financial technology 
associated with securitization”  and does not particularly seem to reflect com- 
petition arising from the growth of superannuation funds. While the trend of 
increasing  securitization  seems  likely  to continue,  the  potential  erosion  of 
banks’ competitive position with respect to traditional lending can easily be 
overstated. As noted by Tease and Wilkinson (1993),  banks continue to have a 
natural specialization in borrower risk assessment, and this is likely to remain 
important even when loans are increasingly in securitized form. 
There is also a clear difference between the liability structures of these two 
classes of financial institutions. Superannuation fund liabilities are the long- 
term savings of their members, whereas bank liabilities are a combination of 
transaction balances, short-term savings, and marketable debt instruments. As 
is documented by Edey, Foster, and Macfarlane (1991), the banking system in 
21.  This distinction is discussed in the Australian context by Tease and Wilkinson (1993). 
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Australia has not traditionally been an important vehicle for longer-term sav- 
ing, and the shorter-tern balances held by households with banks bear a fairly 
stable relation with household income. These balances do not seem likely to 
be closely substitutable by compulsory superannuation balances. Nonetheless, 
the competitive  separation  between  banks  and superannuation  funds on  the 
liabilities side seems to be breaking down at the margin. One important aspect 
of this is the growth of rollover funds, which are tax-favored  superannuation 
vehicles but which do have some of the characteristics of shorter-term savings 
since their funds are highly mobile and not necessarily locked in for long peri- 
ods. Also important is that the superannuation sector is itself an important pro- 
vider of funds to other parts of the financial system. From table 2.5, around 
$40 billion, or 15 percent of superannuation  assets, is currently held as bank 
securities or deposits  with  financial institutions,  a significant proportion  of 
these institutions’ liability base. Growth of these “wholesale” sources of funds 
to the banks represents a potential source of  upward pressure on their average 
cost of  funds. However, the role of  superannuation in this process should not 
be overplayed because it is part of a trend that would be likely to occur anyway, 
through the growth of money market mutual funds and the increasing sophisti- 
cation of retail depositors. 
These competitive issues have led some banks to move into the superannua- 
tion area by establishing life-office subsidiaries or forming partnerships with 
existing major life offices. More recently, it has been announced that banks will 
be allowed to participate directly in some superannuation business by offering 
retirement  savings accounts.  Further  issues concerning  institutional  distinc- 
tions between different parts of the financial sector, and their regulatory-policy 
implications, are the subject of a current government inquiry. 
2.5  Effect on Saving 
As has already been noted, Australia’s gross national saving rate has histori- 
cally been below OECD averages and has declined substantially in the past 
two decades. Much of this decline, illustrated in figure 2.6, can be attributed 
to reduced saving by the public sector. Gross private saving, as conventionally 
measured, has also been declining, although at a lesser rate, while household 
saving declined somewhat faster than the private-sector total. In interpreting 
private-sector saving trends, Edey and Britten-Jones (1990) argued for a focus 
on  aggregate  private  saving  rather  than  on  the  separate  household  and 
corporate-sector components since the exact boundary between them is some- 
what arbitrary and there has historically been a high degree of offset between 
the two forms of saving. They also calculated  an inflation  adjustment of the 
private-saving aggregate that corrects for the wealth transfers between public 
and private sectors effected by inflation. The adjustment has the effect of low- 
ering the peak in private saving recorded in the 1970s and produces an estimate 
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GDP) 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
Net private saving, however, has still shown a trend decline, reflecting an up- 
ward trend in the ratio of depreciation to in~ome.’~ 
Since there has not yet been a sustained increase in superannuation contribu- 
tions, for the reasons described in the previous section, the historical data do 
not provide any direct basis for inferring what is the likely effect of compulsory 
superannuation on aggregate saving. The answer to this question will depend 
critically on the extent to which superannuation displaces other forms of sav- 
ing. A historical estimate of the degree of offset between the two categories of 
saving, reported by Morling and Subbaraman (1993, obtained the rather high 
figure 0.75, implying around three-quarters of a given change in superannua- 
tion saving would be offset elsewhere. But this estimate is derived from a his- 
torical  sample dominated by  the  voluntary  contributions  of  mainly  high- 
income earners and is unlikely to have much bearing on behavior under the 
compulsory  scheme, as the  authors themselves  acknowledge.  The move  to 
compulsory contributions and the expansion of coverage of the system among 
low-income earners, who are more likely to be liquidity constrained, can be 
expected to reduce substantially the degree of substitution between superannu- 
ation and nonsuperannuation  saving in the  future. Other studies  have cited 
lower offset coefficients.  FitzGerald  (1993) uses a coefficient of 0.5, while 
23.  Edey and Britten-Jones (1990)  also argue that the depreciation estimates may be unreliable, 
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Fig. 2.7  RIM projections, addition to national savings (% of GDP) 
Source; RIM Task Force. 
Covick and Higgs (1995) estimate a figure of 0.37 and cite international evi- 
dence for figures of around one-third. 
Projections of the effect of the compulsory scheme have been made by the 
Retirement Income Modelling (RIM) Task Force, using an assumed offset co- 
efficient of ~ne-third.?~  A summary of these projections is presented in figure 
2.7, which shows the estimated additions to saving relative to a baseline sce- 
nari~.~~  A  sharp increase in aggregate  saving is projected  at the end of the 
current decade when the employee and government co-contributions come into 
effect. By the year 2003, when the schedule is fully implemented, saving is 
projected to have increased relative to the baseline by around 3 percent of GDP. 
The peak effect is reached much later, reflecting subsequent reinvestment of 
fund earnings and the fact that significant increases in retirement rates do not 
occur until sometime later. The projections take into account the fiscal revenue 
cost of  superannuation tax concessions as applied to the increased contribu- 
tions  and also the beneficial  effect of  reduced government  pension  outlays; 
these are eventually  projected  to fall by  around  1 percent of GDP when the 
system matures. However, a point of caution is that the funding for the govern- 
24. The task force is jointly  sponsored by  the Treasury, the Department of  Finance, and the 
Department of Social Security. Nonofficial estimates of  the effect of  employer contributions give 
broadly similar results (see Bateman and Piggot 1992; AMP Society 1995; Corcoran and Richard- 
son 1995; and Covick and Higgs 1995). 
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ment co-contribution in these projections comes from not proceeding with tax 
cuts that were already announced, but not yet implemented, when this compo- 
nent of  the scheme was adopted. These tax cuts are included in the baseline 
scenario. Also included in the baseline is the cost of tax concessions applied 
to the existing level of voluntary contributions. 
An important dimension of the overall effect of compulsory superannuation 
concerns its likely effect on the behavior of  those around retirement age. In 
Australia, there was a substantial increase in the rate of early (i.e., pre-sixty- 
five) retirement in the  1970s and 1980s, as illustrated by  the declining male 
labor force participation rates for older age groups, shown in figure 2.8. Anec- 
dotally, this trend is often argued to have been encouraged by the phenomenon 
of “double dipping.” This is where individuals who have accumulated moder- 
ate amounts of superannuation savings retire early, consume the bulk of those 
savings, and then qualify for the government pension at age sixty-five. Such a 
strategy is thought to be attractive where individuals have accumulated enough 
savings to reduce  entitlement to the  government  pension but not enough to 
generate a private  income in retirement that would  substantially exceed  the 
pension. More generally, the  interaction of the personal  income tax  system 
with the means testing of the government pension is argued to create very high 
effective marginal tax rates on saved income for some groups and therefore to 
encourage low rates of labor participation. 
It is possible that this disincentive  effect, acting in the years just prior to 
retirement, is a more important potential source of leakage of saving from the 
- 
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compulsory scheme than other actions to offset higher superannuation saving 
taken by  individuals at earlier  stages in their working lives. The size of the 
effect on saving and labor participation is not accurately known. However, the 
general observation that only a small minority of people currently receive their 
main retirement income from sources other than the government pension does 
seem to suggest important disincentives to save for retirement among low- and 
middle-income  groups. This may well be a factor contributing  to low labor 
force participation rates in the fifty-five to sixty-five age group, even though the 
strict “double-dipping’’ stereotype does not seem to be particularly common.26 
Given the policy objective of maintaining a reasonable safety net through a 
government pension, two broad strategies are available to reduce the adverse 
effects on incentives to save for retirement.  One is to make the government 
pension  universal,  as  is the case in a number of  countries,  including  New 
Zealand. This removes the adverse effect of the means test on effective mar- 
ginal tax rates but raises problems of equity as well as increasing the cost to 
the  government, possibly  reducing  the overall level  of  support  that  can  be 
afforded.  The other approach  is to tighten  the  enforcement  of  compulsory 
self-provision for retirement. This is broadly  what is happening in Australia 
through various measures to increase the attractiveness of annuity benefits rela- 
tive to lump sums, along with a gradual increase in the compulsory preserva- 
tion age for superannuation benefitsz7  These changes should reduce the poten- 
tial  for savings to leak  from the system  in  the years  immediately  prior  to 
retirement.  But changes in these incentives are hard to bring  about quickly 
because of a strong presumption that existing accumulated entitlements should 
be protected from significant rule changes. 
2.6  Conclusions 
The most important distinguishing features of the Australian system are that 
it is government mandated but privately run and that it has been able to make 
use  of  a  well-developed  financial infrastructure  for superannuation  saving, 
through which the new compulsory contributions could be channeled. This has 
meant  that the financial system has adapted  relatively  smoothly  to the new 
arrangements. However, the system has been criticized for being highly com- 
plex in its administrative rules and tax provisions. This complexity is a conse- 
quence of separate tax treatment of contributions from different sources, along 
with the cumulative effect of the various incremental changes that have been 
26.  Survey-based evidence on this issue is provided in Department of  Social Security (1992). 
On the basis of this evidence, Kalisch and Patterson (I  994) argue that stereotypical double dip- 
ping, in the form of holidays or other consumption expenditure financed by  a lump sum, is rare. 
However, Bateman, Kingston, and Piggott (1994) argue that there is still a more broadly defined 
incentive problem associated with the age pension. 
27. The preservation age is to be raised to sixty by the year 2025. Concerning tax incentives to 
encourage annuities, Bateman, Kingston, and Piggott ( 1992) argue that recently introduced incen- 
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made, with successive layers of  changes often embodying  special provisions 
to protect previously accrued rights. 
The new system is projected to have a substantial effect on aggregate saving, 
increasing it by  as much  as 4 percent  of GDP over the next three decades. 
However, it is still in an early part of the transitional stage, and there has not 
yet been  a sustained increase  in net  contributions  to superannuation  funds, 
even though there has been a big expansion of membership. In part, this prob- 
ably reflects significant withdrawals of funds from the superannuation system 
in recent  years through increased redundancies and early retirements. These 
leakages might not be entirely a cyclic phenomenon and may also reflect un- 
derlying  incentives  that  affect  the  attractiveness  of  early  retirement.  The 
longer-term success of the system in meeting its objectives will depend criti- 
cally on whether these leakages can be  contained, by  discouraging  the use 
of lump sum benefits  to finance early retirement  and by  encouraging  labor 
participation in the fifty-five to sixty-five age group. 
Appendix 
Further Details 
This appendix gives additional details on some specific points relating to the 
operation of the previous and the new system in Australia. 
The Previous System 
Australia’s previous system of official retirement income support consisted 
of  two separate elements: the age pension,  which provided  a basic level of 
benefits for most people, and tax-advantaged voluntary savings for retirement. 
The Age Pension 
Benejits 
Australia has an age pension that provides  a flat-rate income for retirees. 
The level of the  pension has varied between 20 and 25  percent of  average 
weekly earnings (AWE) over the past forty years and is currently around 25 
percent. The pension is indexed to the CPI, and the government has committed 
to making irregular ad hoc adjustments to maintain the level at around 25 per- 
cent of AWE. There are also various supplementary benefits available to age 
pensioners, such as cheap public transport, telephone services, and pharmaceu- 
tical benefits. 
Eligibility 
The age pension is available to men over sixty-five and women over sixty 
(although the eligibility age for women is being raised to sixty-five by 20 14). 83  Australia’s Retirement Income System 
The benefit is asset and income tested. Over time, the stringency of the means 
testing has varied. Currently, the assets test reduces the value of the pension by 
$3.00 for every $1,000 of assets above a threshold level ($1 18,000 for single 
people and $167,500 for married couples). The family home is excluded from 
the  assets  test,  although  higher  asset  limits  apply  to nonowner  occupiers 
(owner occupiers with homes worth more than $70,000 are better off under the 
test; the average house price is around $150,000). Income testing reduces the 
value of the pension by  fifty cents for every dollar earned above a fairly low 
threshold ($94.00 per fortnight for singles and $164 per fortnight for couples). 
When this interacts with the income tax system, it can lead to quite high effec- 
tive rates of marginal taxation. 
Funding 
The age pension is funded out of government consolidated revenue; there is 
no explicit tax for the provision of the pension. In  1994-95,  the cost of  the 
pension was $12.7 billion, or 2.8 percent of  GDP. This proportion has been 
relatively stable over time, varying between 2 and 3 percent of GDP. 
Voluntary Superannuation 
The other form of officially sanctioned retirement provision was voluntary 
superannuation: that is, savings for retirement that are concessionally taxed 
and inaccessible until retirement. These schemes could be either accumulation 
funds, with the final payment related to contributions plus earnings, or defined- 
benefit schemes, where the final payment is related to final income. These 
funds invested in assets in much the same way as unit trusts and other profes- 
sionally managed  funds. Many of  the funds were  employer sponsored and 
structured as an employment incentive. Defined-benefit schemes tended to be 
weighted toward longer-term service with the one employer, thus encouraging 
loyalty. The private-sector schemes were all fully funded. 
Public-sector schemes, in contrast to private-sector schemes, were predomi- 
nantly unfunded. Voluntary employee contributions were paid into a fund and 
invested to earn income following a normal accumulation scheme. The govern- 
ment, however, did not pay anything into the schemes and met liabilities out 
of  consolidated revenue as they arose. Current estimates of the net present 
value of these liabilities are around $100 billion for state and federal schemes, 
or around 20 percent of GDP. 
Taxation Changes 
Within  this  institutional  framework,  the taxation  arrangements  were  the 
main area that changed prior to the introduction of the SGC legislation. New 
taxation arrangements introduced mainly in  1983 and 1988 continue to apply 
under the SGC. In the early 1980s, employer contributions to superannuation 
funds, employee contributions (up to a limit of $1,200, equivalent to around 9 
percent of AWE), and income on superannuation assets were tax free. Pension 
payouts were taxed as normal income, while lump sum payouts had the first 5 84  Malcolm Edey and John Simon 
percent added to income for taxation in the year of payout, with the remainder 
tax free. 
In 1983, the status of employee contributions was changed to be no longer 
tax deductible, and they  thus had  to be paid out of  after-tax  income. Other 
changes at that time primarily involved the taxation  of  lump sum payments 
related to employer contributions and fund earnings. These were now taxed at 
30 percent. If the recipient was over fifty-five, the first $55,000 was taxed at 
the concessional rate of 15 percent. While tougher, these changes still involved 
a concessional treatment as earnings remained tax free. There were also grand- 
fathering provisions that exempted pre- 1983 contributions. 
In 1988, the arrangements changed again. Employer contributions were now 
taxed at 15 percent on entry to super funds (although they remained fully tax 
deductible  to the employer). Employee  contributions  were still paid  out  of 
after-tax income. Fund earnings were subject to a 15 percent tax. Pension pay- 
outs were subject to the normal income tax, with a 15 percent rebate, while 
lump sum payouts were subject to 20 percent taxation  or, for recipients over 
fifty-five, were $60,000 tax free and  15 percent on the remainder. The lump 
sum component attributable to employee contributions was tax free. These pro- 
visions remain broadly in place subject to adjustment of the tax-free threshold. 
Another change introduced in  1988 (and fully effective from 1994, after 
some transitional arrangements) was to revamp the reasonable benefit limits 
(RBLs). This was aimed at encouraging people to take benefits in the form of 
annuities and thereby provide for their retirement rather than relying on the 
government pension. The RBL rules stipulate a maximum amount of superan- 
nuation that can benefit from concessional taxation (initially $400,000, to be 
indexed by AWE). Beyond this limit, normal taxation (currently 48.5 percent) 
is applied; this limit doubles if more than half the payout is taken as an annuity. 
The limit is considered to be sufficiently  high that it will affect only high- 
income earners, at least until the new SGC scheme matures in around forty 
years’ time. 
Further changes announced in the  1996-97  budget increase the tax on em- 
ployer contributions to 30 percent for employees earning more than $85,000. 
This higher tax rate is phased in for incomes between $70,000 and $85,000 
and applies only to new contributions made after the announcement date. 
Rules for the New System 
The new system really begins with the introduction of the SGC legislation 
in  1991. However, the introduction of award superannuation in  1986 was an 
important precursor to this. 
Award Superannuation 
In  1985, the union  movement  argued for, and received,  a commitment  to 
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lar general wage rise. This was implemented by inserting a requirement into 
employment awards that employers pay  3 percent of  wages into a nominated 
industry superannuation fund. Many different union-organized industry super- 
annuation funds were created to receive the contributions, which are beginning 
to attain a significant size. As awards were renegotiated, the coverage of super- 
annuation was increased to many more members of the workforce than had 
previously been the case. Nonetheless, the coverage of this  scheme was not 
universal, and, owing to negotiation delays in some areas, not all union mem- 
bers received the benefits immediately. 
SGC Legislation 
In 1991, the government extended the coverage of superannuation to all em- 
ployees by  introducing the  SGC legislation. The legislation mandated  mini- 
mum levels of superannuation contributions by all employers on behalf of their 
employees. The levels were to start at 5 percent (or 3 percent for employers 
with  a payroll of  less than $500,000) and were  scheduled to rise until  they 
reached  9  percent  in  the  2000-2001  financial  year.  The  government  also 
flagged the possibility of raising contributions to 12 percent through employee 
contributions at some later date. The structure of the legislation was that em- 
ployers were not technically mandated to contribute to employee superannua- 
tion but that, if they did not, the government would impose a superannuation 
guarantee charge of an equal amount through the tax system and then redistrib- 
ute this to the employee. The SGC payments would not be tax deductible and 
would have an additional administration charge included. Thus, it would be 
cheaper for employers to make the superannuation contributions themselves. 
Participation 
Participation is mandatory in that employers are required to make contribu- 
tions for all their employees,  subject to some exemptions for part-time and 
casual workers who do not generate sufficient balances. These exemptions are 
made in order to reduce administrative problems associated with contributions 
of very small amounts. In all cases where people do not accumulate sufficient 
balances to fund their retirement, the age pension  will continue to act as a 
safety net. 
Contribution Rates 
The required contributions are detailed in the table 2A.  1. 
Are Some Industries Subject to Different Rules? 
Those industries that were subject to award superannuation continue to be 
bound by those rules. However, the levels of contributions required under the 
award are less than under the SGC legislation and, to that extent, subsumed. 
Nonetheless, the award provisions continue to govern the fund into which con- 
tributions have to be paid. 86  Malcolm Edey and John Simon 
























Individuals  may make additional voluntary contributions.  These are typi- 
cally in the range 2-10  percent of salary. However, the taxation treatment of 
additional contributions is different for employer-provided superannuation as 
those contributions must be paid out of posttax income. Contributions by the 
self-employed are essentially  voluntary. Up to a threshold  amount, they can 
benefit from employer treatment of their contributions for tax purposes. They 
can also qualify for the government co-contribution  on any contributions  as 
employees in line with the schedule. 
Funds Management 
The funds are generally managed by professional managers who are chosen 
by a board of trustees for each superannuation fund. The superannuation funds 
themselves are chosen by the employer or negotiated with the employer as part 
of  the award process. This led to the establishment of union-created “industry 
funds” that cover many workplaces. It is also possible to appoint external trust- 
ees for a more “off the shelf” type of superannuation fund. 
Investment Restrictions 
There are practically no restrictions on where the funds can be invested. The 
only significant one is that no more than  10 percent of funds (at cost) can be 
invested in the business of the sponsoring employer. There are moves to reduce 
this to 5 percent (of market value). In the 1960s and 1970s, rules existed that 
required  superannuation  funds to invest  a  minimum of  30  percent of  their 
assets in government securities, but these rules are no longer in place. 
Payouts 
Benefits  must be “preserved,” that is, made unavailable to the beneficiary, 
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tary contributions that can be withdrawn on change of employment. Legisla- 
tion  is proposed  to raise this to sixty years by  2025. Traditionally, the most 
common form of  benefit has been a lump sum. The more recent RBL provi- 
sions are aimed at encouraging people to take an annuity. The type of  annuity 
purchased can be either a traditional annuity (which provides a given income 
for the rest of the person’s life) or an allocated pension. An allocated pension 
pays an annual income based on investment earnings. The allocated pension is 
not guaranteed to last for the retiree’s lifetime. The difference between these 
two products  is that, with an annuity, the life assurance  company  bears the 
investment and  mortality  risk  while,  with  the  allocated  pension, the retiree 
does. Thus, if a person  with an allocated pension  dies relatively  early, there 
may be a lump sum to be distributed to his or her estate. If a superannuation 
fund member dies before payout, the accumulated contributions are paid to the 
estate and are tax free, regardless of the age of the beneficiary. 
Life Insurance 
Mandated  life  insurance  or disability  provisions  do not  exist.  However, 
many  funds offer these facilities, taking advantage of  the fact that they can 
obtain cheaper life insurance without the necessity of everyone having a medi- 
cal (i.e., pooled life insurance cover). Disability insurance is also offered by 
some on a similar basis. This usually involves the employer paying an extra 
contribution to cover the cost of the insurance. These policies can pay benefits 
as either lump sums or annuities, and the choice made will depend on individ- 
ual  circumstances.  Some schemes also provide  annuities  on retirement  that 
will revert to surviving spouses if the retiree dies relatively early, but this is not 
a mandated requirement. 
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Comment  John Piggott 
Malcolm Edey and John Simon have written an excellent overview of Austra- 
lian retirement income arrangements-clear  and uncluttered with unnecessary 
detail, it emphasizes the main contours of the policies in place as well as those 
still maturing. Given the title of the conference, they have concentrated on the 
superannuation guarantee, as the mandatory element of Australian retirement 
provision is called. I have little to quarrel with in what they write. They focus 
on four key issues: (1) Australia’s employment related retirement income pol- 
icy, embodied in the superannuation  guarantee, is government mandated but 
privately run. (2)  The transition in Australia is different from that which might 
be contemplated in the United States or in other countries that have a pay-as- 
you-go type of  employment-related  social security  system. (3)  Taxation  ar- 
rangements are very important, both in implementing the superannuation guar- 
antee and in its operation; these are very complex. (4) The superannuation 
guarantee is projected  to increase national saving substantially, but this out- 
come is threatened by leakages, particularly those associated with early retire- 
ment and the option, which still exists, to take retirement benefits as a lump 
sum. 
I elaborate on each of these points and then add a list of  policy issues that I 
think will need to be addressed as the superannuation guarantee develops fur- 
ther. In doing this, however, I do not want to suggest that this novel Australian 
policy is not working or that it faces insurmountable problems. In many ways, 
it  is one of  the  most  economically  laudable  retirement  provision  policies 
around. It is, however, a structure that is only half complete. The accumulation 
phase is well developed, if still a little fragile and prone to political risk; the 
benefits phase needs much more attention. Peter Diamond‘s remark, in the con- 
text of the paper on Chile, that it is important to examine the benefit design of 
these policies at the time they are first developed is germane here. 
The Private Mandated Structure 
Only three countries in the world, to my knowledge, have legislated retire- 
ment provision policies that are mandated by the government but privately op- 
erated and that are now well established-Australia,  Chile, and Switzerland. 
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Each of these countries arrived at this policy posture from a different starting 
point, so the transition problems have been different, and the current state of 
the policy varies as well. Many pairwise comparisons can be made between 
Australia and each of the others that exemplify this. But comparing Australia 
with both the others as a combination, the three most important differences are 
the following:  ( 1) Australia  has no regulations  concerning asset allocations 
or minimum rates of return, relying instead on the trustees in charge of each 
superannuation  fund to act in the interests of their members. Australian law 
holds trustees personally liable for the competent discharge of  this task. Chile 
and  Switzerland  both  have maximum  asset allocations  for various types of 
asset and minimum rates of return. (2)  The Australian government offers no 
minimum return guarantee on the mandated contributions, whereas both Chile 
and Switzerland offer such a guarantee. (3) In Australia, retirees can take their 
benefits as a lump sum-there  is no annuity requirement. Both Chile and Swit- 
zerland, and, for that matter, almost all other developed countries, require com- 
pulsory retirement benefits to be taken as an income stream, usually for life 
(Chile is an outlier here). Lump sums from superannuation  are prevalent  in 
Australia; the life annuity market hardly exists. In  1992-93,  Aus$4.7 billion 
was paid out in final benefits to private-sector retirees; only Aus$213 million 
was in the form of an annuity or pension (Bateman and Piggott 1997). 
Transition Differences 
Traditionally, most Australians have relied on the public age pension, along 
with the house they have bought and paid for throughout their working lives, 
to provide for their retirement. No employment-related pay-as-you-go national 
retirement  scheme exists or ever  existed,  although at  various  stages such 
schemes have been proposed and, on one occasion, draft legislation was pre- 
pared, only to be postponed by the onset of World War 11. The superannuation 
guarantee can thus be seen as Australia’s version of retirement social security. 
It is an add on, and therefore no issue of compensation, recognition bonds, or 
anything else arises. This does not mean, however, that there is no transition 
problem in Australia. 
The superannuation  guarantee began with productivity  award superannua- 
tion  (PAS) in the mid-1980s. As the paper points out, this was a nationally 
negotiated arrangement, relying on Australia’s (then) highly centralized wage 
determination system, and involved a 3 percent of  wage payment into a desig- 
nated superannuation fund in lieu of 3 percentage points of pay increase. The 
unions were therefore heavily involved in the early stages of the evolution of 
the superannuation guarantee. This had a number of implications: selling the 
idea to the Australian  worker was made easy because  the unions  wanted it 
and supported it; coverage is restricted to employees; and many of the funds 
designated  were  “industry  funds,”  coinciding in  coverage  with  particular 
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was  effectively  50 percent  union  membership.  This last  consequence  has 
meant that, even though the PAS has now become the superannuation guaran- 
tee, independent of  wage negotiations, it is still hard  to choose other funds 
because the 3 percent PAS must still be paid into the designated fund and to go 
elsewhere with superannuation guarantee contributions would simply double 
administration costs. 
Second, as the authors correctly and pertinently observe, the superannuation 
guarantee used the administrative, legal, and financial structures under which 
the  preexisting  voluntary  occupational  superannuation  worked.  This  meant 
that the design faults with occupational superannuation, which were not partic- 
ularly serious because of the low voluntary private-sector  (funded) coverage, 
applied also to the superannuation guarantee. In particular,  lump sum with- 
drawals are permitted from the age of fifty-five, even though the means-tested 
public age pension is not available until at least sixty and until sixty-five for 
most men. This lack of coordination and integration between the publicly pro- 
vided flat-rate pension and the private superannuation guarantee means that a 
gap exists where  much  leakage of retirement saving can occur.  It probably 
encourages early retirement (Australia is in the top half of OECD countries in 
this regard) and also leads to early asset disposal so as to meet the means- 
test provisions for the age pension. This is the major structural problem in the 
development of  the  superannuation  guarantee as an effective  retirement in- 
come policy-I  will return to it below when I get to my list of policy reforms. 
Taxation Issues 
The authors emphasize the complexity of the taxation of superannuation in 
Australia. But, in my view, they overemphasize grandfathering as its cause and 
play  down the entirely avoidable complexity  introduced by taxing contribu- 
tions, earnings, and benefits. All are taxed concessionally, so it is less the bur- 
den of tax than its complexity that is the difficulty here. However, the flat-rate 
structure does introduce inequities, and the tax on earnings distorts net-of-tax 
returns, adversely affecting asset choice. In addition, earnings taxes probably 
further encourage early retirement since it is when retirement is a viable option 
that the earnings tax bites most severely, reducing the lifetime reward for work- 
ing another year. 
A further point about the separation of  superannuation tax rates from the 
personal tax rate schedule is that political risk is increased-if,  as in the United 
States, only benefits were taxed at the retiree’s marginal rate, it would be much 
more difficult for any government  to change  superannuation taxation unless 
the personal schedule were also changed. (This observation was made before 
the 20 August  1996 budget statement, which increased the contributions tax 
on high-income earners from 15 to 30 percent.) 
I also comment briefly on the allusion in the paper to tax expenditures. The 
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nual estimate prepared by the Australian Treasury for the tax-expenditure state- 
ment. The most important of several objections that can be raised against the 
use of tax-expenditure estimates in the present context is that they are calcu- 
lated using a single year. If a time dimension is introduced into the calculation, 
it is easy to show that, for many employees, the present value of the cost of the 
superannuation  tax concession  is negative,  once reduced future age pension 
payouts are factored in. In fact, the Treasury has itself published a paper dem- 
onstrating exactly this proposition  (Brown 1993). Tax expenditure estimates 
are important politically because they are used as a kind of weapon to fend off 
anyone who advocates tax-preferred  status for saving-especially  silly in a 
nation that publicly acknowledges its poor saving performance and that has a 
broad  tax  design tilted  more toward  capital  taxes than in  most  comparable 
countries. Australia  relies heavily  on income taxation, including an indexed 
but full marginal rate-type  capital gains tax, and there is neither a social secu- 
rity tax, nor state-based retail sales taxes, nor a general goods and services tax. 
Saving 
The superannuation  guarantee  must  in the first instance be assessed as a 
mechanism for providing adequate retirement income. But, with looming dem- 
ographic transition, the feasibility of such arrangements inevitably depends on 
their fundedness. An important by-product of  the superannuation  guarantee, 
which is by and large funded, is that the effect on private saving is likely to be 
positive. This has proved to be a major selling point for the policy; both govern- 
ment and industry regularly produce estimates of its positive effects on saving. 
It is no doubt true that the superannuation  guarantee  will increase private 
and national saving. The quantum would be much larger if the integration and 
coordination of preservation age with the age pension were fixed up. The esti- 
mates quoted in the paper are based on the assumption that an indexed life 
annuity  is bought  by  retirees  to the value  of  75 percent  of  their retirement 
benefit. While 25 percent lump sum dissipation is probably a reasonable  as- 
sumption, very few retirees buy indexed annuities, and it is therefore probable 
that these estimates overstate the saving implied by controlled asset disposal 
through retirement. This affects both private saving (directly) and public sav- 
ing: the consequent reduction in means-tested age pension outlays is probably 
overstated as well. Currently, the proportion of retirement cohorts drawing the 
age pension increases with age; in the absence of appropriately indexed annu- 
ity purchase, this pattern is likely to continue, even when the superannuation 
guarantee is fully mature. 
A largely ignored effect of the superannuation guarantee is its effect on the 
composition of  saving. Here, the benefits might be expected to be substantial. 
Housing is heavily tax preferred in Australia. Owner-occupier housing is omit- 
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a negligible effect on access to the age pension. Residential real estate invest- 
ment is particularly suitable for tax-minimizing negative-gearing arrangements 
because the debt service is more likely to be met evenly by rental returns than 
by returns on equity investment and real estate is an attractive form of collateral 
for lenders. Unlike most other OECD countries, there is no tax-preferred chan- 
nel for financial saving that is not employment linked, such as an IRA. Non- 
workers who inherit have the choice of paying a lot of tax, spending the inheri- 
tance, upgrading their owner-occupied home, or negatively gearing. It is not 
surprising that about 60 percent of private net wealth in Australia is in the form 
of residential real estate, owned or rented. 
Under current policy, almost all superannuation guarantee saving is directed 
toward investments other than housing. This is likely to move the composition 
of  saving in Australia in the right direction; although no quantitative research 
has been undertaken, I think it possible that the welfare gain from the reduction 
in this distortion is at least as important as the effect on aggregate saving rates. 
A Partial Policy Agenda 
It may be useful to lay out a list of outstanding policy deficiencies that will 
need to be addressed over the next period if Australia’s mandatory retirement 
saving plan is to be a long-term success. 
Retirement Income Streams 
At the top of the list is the introduction of retirement income streams. Most 
analysts believe that this will eventually be achieved through compulsion in 
some form, although the design (a lump sum for the first $x,  then compulsory 
annuity purchase, or compulsory annuity purchase to $y per year, then a lump 
sum option, to give two possibilities) remains unclear. 
In the meantime, the market is drawing out some interesting products. One, 
which has emerged in the last few months, combines what in Australia are 
called allocated  pensions, and in Chile are termedphased withdrawals, with a 
deferred life annuity that begins at age eighty, the expected exhaustion age of 
the allocated pension. The deferred life annuity, sold at age sixty-five, does not 
cost much, and the retiree retains considerable control over his or her capital 
through the fifteen-year deferral period. A second design, first suggested in the 
Australian context by  Formica and Kingston  (1991) and now being actively 
considered by annuity sellers, is an inflation-indexed annuity with a deductible. 
Indexation does not cut in until annuity purchasing power has been reduced 
through a cumulative price level increase of, say,  15 percent. In the version 
being considered commercially, the annuity payment then increases to 115 per- 
cent of its initial value and stays there until the price level has risen by a further 
15 percentage points,  at which time a compensating increase in the annuity 
payment is made once again. This design allows the initial annuity payment to 94  Malcolm Edey and John Simon 
be considerably  larger than  can be offered  with  a fully  indexed  instrument 
while at the same time providing inflation  insurance against large and unex- 
pected price-level movements. 
A problem  not so far addressed by  either policy  makers or researchers  in 
Australia is that of annuity rate risk. If  annuity purchase is to be mandatory, 
then variations in the price of the annuity close to the time of retirement can 
make a large difference to the rest of life income. One possibility is gradual 
deferred annuity purchase, along the lines proposed by  Brugiavini (1993) (al- 
though his analysis is motivated by adverse selection considerations rather than 
annuity rate risk). 
It is entirely possible that policy will converge with the market-eventually 
compelling an income product with longevity and inflation insurance proper- 
ties that nevertheless does not cut into immediate consumption too deeply and 
that leaves the retiree with some capital discretion to cope with contingencies 
such as health expenses. Sooner rather than later, however, some policy initia- 
tive will be required on income streams. 
Taxation 
As I indicated earlier, the complexity of superannuation taxation in Australia 
stems from the multiple bases on which the tax is levied. To my knowledge, 
Australia is the only country to tax all three of these possible bases, and their 
consolidation would do everyone some good. The best option would be to abol- 
ish the taxes on contributions and earnings and to tax benefits at the retiree’s 
marginal rate, as is done in the United States. The implications for the current 
budget balance probably render this infeasible. An alternative might be to tax 
contributions at a flat rate and tax benefits at the retiree’s marginal rate less the 
flat-rate contributions tax. The earnings tax seems to have no virtue whatsoever 
and should be abolished without delay. 
Coverage and Replacement 
As the authors of the paper point out, superannuation guarantee coverage is 
confined to employees. It is likely to provide adequate retirement income only 
for those whose work histories have been more or less continuous. For those 
with broken work histories, the accumulations can be much le 
coverage at any level remains voluntary for the self-employed, and, except for 
a recently introduced dependent-spouse provision, those not in the labor force 
enjoy no tax-preferred financial saving opportunities whatsoever. 
It would appear desirable to extend superannuation  guarantee coverage to 
these individuals. In part, their exclusion results from the union-based origins 
of  the  policy;  in  part,  the  accounting  and  compound interest  properties  of 
defined-contribution schemes tell against workers with broken work histories. 
The first of  these is more easily  overcome than the  second. For those  with 
broken work histories, the age pension acts as a form of social insurance, and 
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Member Choice 
The present government has indicated that it will encourage greater choice 
for superannuation, both between funds and between portfolios within funds. 
While economic rhetoric clearly supports the idea that contributors should be 
able to change their fund if they wish, costs of administration, about which not 
nearly enough is known, may make this less desirable than it seems at first 
sight. Certainly, in some cases, the administrative costs of  transfer between 
funds  in  Australia  seem high,  although  this  situation  is  being  addressed 
through the agreement of a “transfer protocol.” Additionally, choice of fund is 
seen by the industry as being associated with what in Australia is called short 
tennism and what U.S. analysts succinctly term myopic  loss aversion. This 
allegedly leads fund managers  to invest more conservatively  than  might be 
appropriate for many of  their members. The truth of  this claim remains un- 
tested. 
Of more interest is a move toward greater portfolio choice within a fund. A 
few years ago, I was involved in an informal survey of the hundred or so indus- 
try funds that receive a large proportion of the superannuation guarantee con- 
tributions.  Only two offered members a choice of portfolios. Yet these funds 
have as members people of very different ages, for whom standard age-phasing 
arguments would seem to indicate very different optimal portfolios. Member 
investment choice is beginning to become more widely available and should, 
in my view, be actively encouraged by policy. One retarding factor thus far has 
been the nervousness of trustees, who have been unsure of their potential liabil- 
ity on advice to members as to which portfolio to choose. Appropriate guid- 
ance by the Insurance and Superannuation Commission, the Australian regula- 
tor, would appear to be all that is necessary to cope with this. 
My comments have sought to elaborate on a paper that has met its objectives 
very well. In doing so, I have spent much time criticizing various aspects of 
current Australian arrangements. I would therefore like to conclude by reiterat- 
ing that I think the Australian superannuation guarantee is a very good policy, 
one that in many respects other countries now seek to emulate. Because few 
countries have done anything similar, there are no really  appropriate models 
from which Australia can work, and a number of difficulties, conceptual, ethi- 
cal, and practical, still need  to be addressed. It remains to be seen whether 
there is sufficient commitment to complete this task successfully. 
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Discussion Summary  Jeffrey Liebman and Andrew Samwick 
The discussion began by  noting some comparisons with the Chilean system. 
The employer mandate in the Australian system allowed for the selling costs to 
be priced on a group basis. Therefore, compared to Chile’s system of individual 
selling, the administrative costs were hypothesized to be about two-thirds less. 
The authors quoted a figure of  1  percent of balances for administrative costs 
but acknowledged that the churning of accounts was expensive. The Chilean 
system is actually better designed to keep the number of accounts low, thereby 
contributing  to administrative  savings when jobs turn  over. The authors re- 
sponded that, in fact, much of the system in Australia is being organized on a 
group basis. For example, the current government has allowed for easier con- 
solidation of accounts as long as they are held in banks. 
The particular way that Australia means tests its retirement benefits required 
clarification. Benefits are reduced by 50 percent of income above a threshold 
and 3 percent of assets above a different threshold. The value of the family 
home  is exempted from the  means test. Married  couples get approximately 
double the replacement rate of single persons, so it is unlikely that the means 
test is responsible for many “fiscal divorces.” An example of the moral hazard 
that is permitted by the means test was to take early retirement at age fifty-five, 
receive a lump sum distribution, spend down assets, and then begin collecting 
the means-tested benefit in old age. It was noted that the replacement rate of- 
fered by the means-tested benefit is quite generous for workers below the top 
quintile of the income distribution. The authors suggested that reasonable ben- 
efit  limits  are  likely  within  the  next  ten  years  to limit  the  amount of  tax- 
preferred, nonannuity withdrawals. 
Participants  also  inquired  about  the  political  economy of  the transition. 
Low-income workers are thought to have lost out in the transition because they 
received  roughly  the  same benefits  as  before  but  now  make contributions. 
Union  involvement  was cited as being very important  in the setup phase to 
gather support for a universal  retirement  scheme. Trade unions are also very 
involved in the details of the current system. Some of the idiosyncracies  of 
the  government’s  plan  were  inherited  from  existing  industrial  relations 
agreements, and all revisions to the plan must still be ratified through the in- 
dustrial relations system. The authors noted that the expectations of the unions 
were that the  gains from privatization  would  come at the  expense of  wage 
increases. Several questions were asked regarding the response of employers 97  Australia’s Retirement Income System 
to the transition. The authors admitted that there has been no solid evidence 
yet that retirement dates changed as a result of the transition, probably because 
such an effect would be difficult to identify against a backdrop of  a secular 
trend toward earlier retirement, business-cycle effects, and a tendency for lay- 
offs in Australia to be concentrated among workers over age fifty-five. 
Some participants wondered  why the annuity option was not taken  more 
frequently, given the apparent tax subsidy. Suggested reasons for the annuity 
option’s unpopularity were the perceived low rates of return on annuities, pos- 
sibly owing to adverse selection, and the feeling that investors lose control 
over their own money once it is annuitized. Still another possibility  was the 
permissiveness of the lump sum option. In Chile, for example, the lump sum 
option is allowed only if it still leaves enough in the account to fund a benefit 
that is a 70 percent replacement rate and equals 120 percent or more of the 
guaranteed minimum pension. Only 24 percent of the eligible retirees in Chile 
have taken the lump sum option. Finally, under Australian tax rules, the princi- 
pal of  the annuity is taxed as income, so it was acknowledged that, in some 
instances, it might be better to take the lump sum distribution and pay the 15 
percent tax rather than buying the annuity. 